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Abstract 
Corruption in general and bribery in particular is a topic of global concern. External auditors are required by audit 
standards to assess and respond to the risk of illegal acts, yet neither the audit standards nor do prior studies provide 
a guide for external auditors to audit bribery risks. Hence, the aim of the current study is to help external auditors 
assess and respond to bribery risks. To achieve this, the current study proposes a guide that might help external 
auditorsassess and respond to bribery risks. The proposed guide is based on evidence from prior literature and the 
insights from the audit profession in Egypt. Data was collected by the means of mixed methods, mainly an online 
questionnaire and semi-structured interviews. Our results supports the current body of knowledge that argued for the 
effectiveness of red flags in fraud risk assessments, however our study was the first to explore the effectiveness of 
red flags for bribery. Our findings also revealed that although red flags for bribery were perceived as effective in 
assessing bribery risks, not all of them have the same significance. Our study was the first to suggest how external 
auditors might respond to the heightened red flags for bribery. The current study also provides recommendations to 
audit regulators, audit firms, policy makers, and researchers on how to combat corruption and bribery. 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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INTRODUCTION
Corruption in general and bribery in particular is a topic 
of global concern. This was evident in the recent bribery 
scandals such as the case of FIFA and Petrobras 
Company in Brazil (Kassem and Higson, 2016). 
Corruption is one of the most difficult types of 
corporate fraud to detect because of the lack of audit 
trail in most cases (Wells, 2005) and bribery is the most 
common and costly type of corruption (Wells, 2005; 
ACFE, 2014). Hence, this motivated the current study to 
focus on bribery. Although detecting corruption and 
bribery requires the efforts of different stakeholders 
(Institute of Internal Auditors, 2014), external auditors 
are more likely to come under scrutiny in caseof 
corruption scandals. This was supported by Kassem and 
Higson (2016) who argued that in the recent FIFA 
corruption scandal many people questioned the value of 
audits because of the clean opinions that FIFA received 
each year. The authors added that the public expects 
external auditors to at least identify opportunities for 
corruption and bribery when they exist, otherwise this 
may result in higher settlement costs for audit firms. 
The International Standards on Auditing No. 250 (ISA 
No.250): Consideration of Laws and Regulations in an 
Audit of Financial Statements required external auditors 
to assess and respond to risks of illegal acts, however 
there was no guidance on how external auditors could 
assess and respond to bribery risks.  
 
In the meantime, reviewing prior literature showed a 
scarcity of research into the role of external auditors in 
combating corruption and bribery and a lack of research 
that provide external auditors with a guide or a tool to 
actually assess and respond to bribery risks. This further 
motivated the current study to fill in this gap in the 
literature by proposing a guide that might help external 
auditors to assess and respond to bribery risks. The 
proposed guide includes types of bribery, a list of red 
flags for bribery ranked according to their relative 
significance, and audit procedures to help external 
auditors respond to each of the heightened red flags for 
bribery. The proposed guide was based on findings from 
prior literature and the perception of external auditors in 
the Egyptian context.  
 
Although bribery is a global concern, the Egyptian 
context was of particular interest for two reasons. First, 
the scarcity of fraud research in Egypt leaves the 
developing world undiscovered in this area compared to 
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the developed countries. This might have an impact on 
countries that are conducting business in Egypt due to 
the lack of knowledge about this context. This 
motivated the current study to expand knowledge in the 
area of fraud in a context that has hardly been explored 
before in prior literature. Second, Egypt is confronted 
with both grand and pretty corruption which is a major 
obstacle to business operations and growth (the 
European Commission, 2009; Transparency 
International, 2014). Although the current study was 
conducted in Egypt, the proposed guide included 
examples of red flags for bribery that was found in real 
fraud cases worldwide. This makes the proposed bribery 
guide applicable globally.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II 
reviews prior literature into the area of corruption and 
bribery detection including the responsibility of external 
auditors for corporate corruption, and how the proposed 
guide for bribery was designed. Section III describes 
and explains the methods of data collection and 
analysis. Section IV presents and discusses the main 
findings of the current study and the proposed guide for 
bribery. Section V includes the conclusion and 
recommendations. Section VI provides some ideas for 
future research 
 
PRIOR STUDIES & RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
External auditors are required by the international audit 
standards to assess and respond to fraud risks as well as 
illegal acts. For instance, in relation to the responsibility 
of external auditors for fraud, both the International 
Standard on Auditing (ISA) No. 200:Overall Objective 
of the Independent Auditor, and the Conduct of an Audit 
in accordance with International Standards on Auditing 
that was issued by the International Assurance and 
Auditing Standards Board (IAASB) in 2007 and ISA 
No. 240:the Auditor’s Responsibility Relating to Fraud 
in an Audit of Financial Statements required external 
auditors to provide reasonable assurance that the 
financial statements are free from material 
misstatements whether due to error or fraud. As for the 
responsibility of external auditors for illegal acts, ISA 
No.250 Consideration of Laws and Regulations in an 
Audit of Financial Statements required external auditors 
to take into consideration the applicable legal and 
regulatory framework in conducting the audit of 
financial statements. 
 
However, an examination of the audit standards 
revealed that no guidance was provided to external 
auditors on how to assess and respond to corruption and 
bribery risks. This was supported by Kassem and 
Higson (2016) who argued that audit standards has 
given little attention to external auditors’ responsibilities 
with regards to corporate corruption. In the meantime, 
reviewing prior literature revealed that no studies have 
actually provided a guide or an aid for external auditors 
to detect bribery and very few studies explored the role 
of external auditors in corporate corruption (Uecher et 
al., 1981; Albrecht et al., 2012; Kassem and Higson, 
2016). This motivated the current study to fill in this 
gap in the literature by proposing a guide that might 
help external auditors assess and respond to bribery 
risks.  
 
In order to design the proposed guide, it was important 
to address the following research questions: (1) how 
could external auditors assess bribery risks? (2) How 
could external auditors respond to bribery risks? To 
address the first research question, prior literature was 
reviewed thoroughly for an effective technique that 
could help external auditors assess fraud risks in 
general. This review revealed a stream of research 
suggesting the use of red flags as an effective technique 
for assessing fraud risks but no study has actually 
explored red flags for bribery and corruption 
(Hackenbrack, 1993; Vicky et al., 1996; Loebbecke, et 
al., 1989; Weisenborn and Norris,1997; Bell and 
Carcello, 2000; Glover et al., 2003; Saksena, 2010; 
Hogan et al., 2008; Webber, et al., 2004; Farber, 2005; 
Grazioli et al., 2006; Murcia and Borba, 2007; Alleyne 
et al., 2010). On the other hand, reviewing prior 
literature revealed some views against the use of red 
flags in fraud detection. For instance, some argued that 
red flags are merely indicators of potential fraud but do 
not automatically mean that fraud is occurring (Parodi, 
2005 as cited by Murcia and Borba, 2007), too general 
and difficult to operationalise in empirical research 
(Owusu-Anash et al., 2002), not considered effective as 
it focuses attention on specific cues which in turn inhibit 
internal and external auditors from identifying other 
reasons that cause fraud to occur (Bierstaker, et al., 
2006), difficult to combine and weight to assess overall 
fraud risk and formulate an audit plan (Patterson and 
Noel, 2003 as cited by Hogan et al. 2008), and are very 
limited in terms of assessing overall risk of financial 
fraud (Owusu-Anash et al., 2002; Bierstaker, et al., 
2006; Hogan et al. 2008; McKee 2010).  These mixed 
results regarding the effectiveness of red flags in 
detecting fraud lead to an inconclusive evidence in this 
area and thus it was important for our study to seek the 
perception of respondents with regards to the 
effectiveness of red flags for bribery to ensure the 
reliability of the guide. We found one source that 
provided examples of red flags for bribery, that’s Wells 
(2005) book “Principles of Fraud Examination”. Wells’ 
book was based on the analysis of real fraud cases 
taking place worldwide. Our study thus replicated 
Wells’ work in a different context to explore the 
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relevance and validity of the proposed guide. These red 
flags for bribery were then compiled in a list of 13 red 
flags for bribery which formed the basis for our 
proposed guide as shown in table 1. 
 
Table 1 Red flags for bribery  
Red flags Types of 
Corruption 
The purchase of inferior-quality inventory or 
merchandise with very near expiration date 
Bribery/Kickbacks 
The difference in price between the materials 
that were contracted for and those that were 
actually delivered 
Bribery/Kickbacks 
Unusual or unexplained fluctuation in 
payables, expenses or disbursements 
Bribery/Kickbacks 
Improper or unauthorized payment for goods 
or services 
Bribery/Kickbacks 
Unusually high price contracts for goods or 
services purchased by the company 
Bribery/ Bid-
rigging 
The existence of very large, unexplained 
price differences among bidders 
Bribery/ Bid-
rigging 
The prices of the company’s suppliers are 
higher than market rate 
Bribery/Kickbacks 
A particular contractor repeatedly wins the 
contract 
Bribery/ Bid-
rigging 
An employee of the company who has close 
relationships with the supplier 
Bribery/Kickbacks 
Cases when low-bid awards are frequently 
followed by change orders or amendments 
that significantly increase payments to the 
vendor 
Bribery/ Bid-
rigging 
When qualified bidders fail to submit 
contract proposals or fewer bidders than 
expected respond to a request for proposals 
Bribery/ Bid-
rigging 
Budget overruns either because of 
overcharges or excessive quantities 
purchased or both 
Bribery/Kickbacks 
Poor credit ratings and the company’s 
inability to pay its debt in due dates 
Bribery/Kickbacks 
Source: Wells (2005) 
 
Some studies argued that it is important for external 
auditors to know the significance of red flags in order 
not to assume that all indicators are equally important, 
and thereby overlook the most significant once 
(Casabon, and Grego, 2003; Wells, 2004; Hoffman and 
Zimbelman, 2009). Hence, the current study also sought 
to determine external auditors’ perception of the relative 
significance of the proposed list of red flags for bribery. 
This led to the following two sub-questions that were 
necessary to address the first research question: (1a) Are 
the proposed red flags for bribery effective in assessing 
bribery risks? (1b) Do all the proposed red flags for 
bribery have the same significance? No studies were 
found in prior literature in relation to how external 
auditors could respond to bribery risks and thus our 
study explored this area via interviewing external 
auditors working at audit firms in Egypt. Hence this 
helped in addressing the 2
nd
 research question “How 
could external auditors respond to red flags for bribery”.  
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
Data was collected from external auditors working at 
audit firms in Egypt. Stratified purposive sampling was 
used to decide on the study sample. Stratified purposive 
sampling is a mixed method sampling technique that 
requires the researcher to first stratifies the potential 
participants based on certain dimensions using 
procedures consistent with probabilistic sampling and 
then purposefully selects a small number of cases from 
each stratum (Creswell and Clark, 2011). The stratified 
nature of this sampling technique is similar to 
probability sampling and the small number of cases it 
generates is characteristic of purposive sampling 
(Teddlie and Tashakkori, 2009). Thus, the study sample 
included external auditors working at different audit 
firms in Egypt such as the Big4, international audit 
firms other than the Big 4, national audit firms, and 
auditors working at the Accountability State Authority 
(ASA). 
 
To address the first research question, an online 
questionnaire link was emailed to 100 respondents. 
“Bristol Online Surveys” was used to design the online 
questionnaire. All respondents were Linkedin contacts. 
Linkedin is a professional network. 93 questionnaires 
were received making a response rate of 93%. The 
questionnaire included a section about respondents’ 
demographic details includingaudit experience, type of 
audit office, gender, age, and professional 
qualifications. A copy of the questionnaire is available 
in Appendix A. In order to address the second research 
question, 20 semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with respondents via Skype. The questionnaire included 
a question to seek respondents’ consent to participate in 
an interview later for the purpose of the current study. 
This helped in forming the interview sample. The 
interview schedule included seven questions - five 
questions were seeking interviewees’ demographic 
details, one question was aiming to address question 2 
(i.e. how could external auditors respond to the 
heightened red flags of bribery?), and another question 
asking respondents if they have any other points to add 
regarding the current research issue. This was to 
encourage them to discuss issues related to external 
auditors and corporate corruption that have not been 
covered by the current study. A copy of the interview 
schedule is available in Appendix B.  
 
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH RESULTS 
Questionnaire Data 
Respondents’ demographic details 
Data collected via the questionnaire was analysed using 
SPSS. Results from tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 below showed 
that the majority of respondents work at international 
audit firms other than the Big 4 and only two 
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respondents work at Big 4 audit firms. This is because 
gaining access to auditors working at the Big 4 was 
quite difficult. The experience of respondents ranged 
from (0-2) years of audit experience to more than ten 
years of audit experience with the majority having from 
(3-5) years of audit experience. This is because the 
current study included technical questions that required 
respondents of a minimum of 2 years of audit 
experience to be able to understand and answer the 
current research questions. All respondents were males. 
This might be due to the fact that the majority of 
females in Egypt are unemployed. This is supported by 
Krafft and Assaad (2014) who found that 11% of all 
young women in Egypt are unemployed, 75% of young 
women are inactive, and almost 90% of uneducated and 
basic educated young women are out of the labour 
force. They also found that even women with higher 
education participate at only moderate rates, as 49% 
remain out of the labour force and only 32% are actually 
employed.  The majority of respondents (40% of 
respondents) aged (20-30) years old followed by 31-40 
years old.  
 
All respondents had audit qualifications but very few 
had the Certified Fraud Examiners (CFE) qualification. 
This indicates that fraud education might not be as 
common in Egypt as other audit professional 
qualifications like the ACCA and CPA. 
 
Table 2:Respondents’ Years of Audit Experience 
Years of 
audit 
experience 
(0-2) 
years  
(3-5) 
years 
(6-10) 
years 
More than 
10 years of 
experience 
Total 
Respondents 26 31 18 18 93 
 
Table 3: Respondents’ Type of Audit Office 
Types of 
audit office 
Local International Big 4 Total 
Respondents 16 75 2 93 
 
Table 4: Respondents’ age 
Age 20-30 
years 
old 
31-40 
years 
old 
41-50 
years 
old 
Above 50 
years old 
Total 
Respondents 40 15 30 8 93 
 
Table 5: Respondents Audit Professional Qualifications 
Professional 
Qualifications  
ACA CPA CFE IIA Qualification 
from ESAA 
Respondents 40 80 6 10 30 
 
The Effectiveness of Red Flags for Bribery 
Respondents were asked about their perception of the 
effectiveness of the proposed list of red flags in 
assessing bribery risks. Table 6 shows that the majority 
of respondents (63% to 95.7%) agreed that the proposed 
red flags for bribery would be effective in assessing 
bribery risks. This supports the current body of 
knowledge that argued for the effectiveness of red flags 
in fraud risk assessments (Hackenbrack, 1993; Vicky et 
al., 1996; Loebbecke, et al., 1989; Weisenborn and 
Norris, 1997; Bell and Carcello, 2000; Glover et al., 
2003; Saksena, 2010; Hogan et al., 2008; Webber, et al., 
2004; Farber, 2005; Grazioli et al., 2006; Murcia and 
Borba, 2007; Alleyne et al., 2010). However our study 
was the first to explore the effectiveness of red flags for 
bribery. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Effectiveness of Red Flags of Bribery 
Red flags Yes  No  
 Frequency % Frequency % 
The purchase of inferior-quality inventory or merchandise with very near 
expiration date 
82 88.2 11 11.8 
The difference in price between the materials that were contracted for and 
those that were actually delivered 
89 95.7 4 4.3 
Unusual or unexplained fluctuation in payables, expenses or disbursements 83 89.2 10 10.8 
Improper or unauthorized payment for goods or services 80 86 13 14 
Unusually high price contracts for goods or services purchased by the 
company 
81 87.1 12 12.9 
The existence of very large, unexplained price differences among bidders 77 82.6        16 17.4 
The prices of the company’s suppliers are higher than market rate 84 90.3 9 9.7 
A particular contractor repeatedly wins the contract 88 94.6 5 5.4 
An employee of the company who has close relationships with the vendor 84 90.3 9 9.7 
Cases when low-bid awards are frequently followed by change orders or 
amendments that significantly increase payments to the vendor 
84 90.3 9 9.7 
When qualified bidders fail to submit contract proposals or fewer bidders than 
expected respond to a request for proposals 
71 76.1 22 23.9 
Budget overruns either because of overcharges or excessive quantities 
purchased or both 
59 63 34 37 
Poor credit ratings and the company’s inability to pay its debt in due dates      75 80                 18 20 
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The Significance of Red Flags for Bribery 
Respondents were asked to rank the proposed red flags 
for bribery according to their relative significance using 
a scale from 1 to 5 where “1” denoted the least 
significant, and “5” denoted the most significant. The 
results from table 7 showed that red flags for bribery do 
not have the same significance. The most significant red 
flags for bribery appeared to be: “The difference in 
price between the materials that were contracted for and 
those that were actually delivered”, “a particular 
contractor repeatedly wins the contract”, and “an 
employee of the company who has close relationships 
with the supplier”. While the least significant red flags 
include: “When qualified bidders fail to submit contract 
proposals or fewer bidders than expected respond to a 
request for proposals”, and “budget overruns either 
because of overcharges or excessive quantities 
purchased or both”. The respondents did not explain 
why these red flags are the least significant in assessing 
the risk of bribery. However, these red flags might be 
less common in the Egyptian context or may be budget 
overruns is rather more a sign of poor management than 
corruption.  
 
Table 7: Ranked Red Flags of Bribery according to their 
Relative Significance 
Red flags Respondents’ 
rankings  
The difference in price between the materials 
that were contracted for and those that were 
actually delivered 
90% ranked this 
red flag as “5” 
A particular contractor repeatedly wins the 
contract 
83” ranked this red 
flag as “5” 
An employee of the company who has close 
relationships with the supplier 
80% ranked this 
red flag as “5” 
Cases when low-bid awards are frequently 
followed by change orders or amendments that 
significantly increase payments to the vendor 
75% ranked this 
red flag as “4” 
Unusual or unexplained fluctuation in 
payables, expenses or disbursements 
70% ranked this 
red flag as “4” 
The purchase of inferior-quality inventory or 
merchandise with very near expiration date 
55% ranked this 
red flag as “4” 
Unusually high price contracts for goods or 
services purchased by the company 
50% ranked this 
red flag as “4” 
Improper or unauthorized payment for goods 
or services  
50% ranked this 
red flag as “4” 
The existence of very large, unexplained price 
differences among bidders 
35%  ranked this 
red 
flag as “4” 
The prices of the company’s suppliers are 
higher than market rate 
30% ranked this 
red flag as “4” 
Poor credit ratings and the company’s inability 
to pay its debt in due dates 
28%  ranked this 
red flag as “4” 
When qualified bidders fail to submit contract 
proposals or fewer bidders than expected 
respond to a request for proposals 
35% ranked this 
red flag as “1” 
Budget overruns either because of overcharges 
or excessive quantities purchased or both 
50% ranked this 
red flag as “1” 
 
 
 
INTERVIEWS DATA  
Interviewees’ Demographic Details 
The interviewees were asked about their age, audit 
experience, job titles, the type of the audit office they 
work at, and whether they have any professional 
qualifications. Table 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 summarised 
the demographic details of interviewees and showed 
that interviewees’ age ranged from (20-30) to above 50 
years old. The audit experience they have ranged from 
two years to more than ten years while the majority of 
interviewees had from six to ten years of audit 
experience. The interviews were conducted with ten 
audit managers, five audit seniors, and five audit 
partners. The majority worked for international audit 
firms other than the Big 4. They all have professional 
qualifications such as ACA, CPA, CFE, and ESAA, 
however the majority of interviewees have either CPA 
or qualification from the Egyptian Society of 
Accountants and Auditors (ESAA).  
 
Table 8 Interviewees Age 
Age  20-30 
years old  
31-40 
years old  
41-50 
years old 
Above 50 
years old  
Interviewees  5 6 6 3 
 
Table 9 Interviewees Audit Years of Experience  
Audit years of 
experience  
0-2 3-5 6-10 More than 10 
Interviewees 1 4 10 5 
 
Table 10 Interviewees Job Title 
Job title Audit 
Partner 
Audit 
manager 
Audit Senior 
Interviewees 5 10 5 
 
Table 11 Type of Audit Office  
Type of audit 
office 
Big 4 International 
other than Big 4 
Local audit 
firm 
Interviewees 2 13 5 
 
Table 12 Interviewees Audit Professional Qualifications 
Audit 
professional 
qualifications  
ACA CPA CFE Qualification 
from ESAA 
Interviewees 8 11 2 13 
 
How Could External Auditors Respond to the 
Proposed Red Flags for Bribery? 
Interviewees were given a list of the 13 proposed red 
flags for bribery and were asked how they could 
respond to each. Interviewees’ responses showed that 
“management’s inquiry” is the most common audit 
procedure used to respond to bribery risks. One of the 
interviewees mentioned that: 
 “In case of unusually high price contracts for goods or 
services purchased by the company the auditor should 
review the contracts and bids for any trends in prices. A 
comparison with industry norms could be a good 
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indicator. Management should also be advised to 
monitor price trends”.  
 
Another interviewee added that: 
 “If a particular contractor repeatedly wins the contract, 
auditors should investigate what actually happens for 
bidders participating in the various bids. They should 
also inquire key employees and management about the 
reason behind this”.  
 
The responses of all interviewees were summarised in 
table 13 “External auditors’ guide for detecting 
bribery”.  
The interviewees were also asked if they have any other 
points to add in relation to the role of external auditors 
in detecting corruption and bribery. Some of them 
quoted the following: 
 “External auditors in Egypt will never be successful in 
detecting fraud in general and corruption in particular 
with the current weak legal system and lack of an 
effective and robust audit regulatory body to oversee the 
audit quality” 
“It is very difficult to detect corruption because it is 
embedded in the culture. Some businesses accept or 
give bribery and record it as facilitation costs” 
“External auditors are not successful in detecting 
corruption because the audit standards did not require 
them to detect corruption in the first place” 
“Even if I decided to detect corruption, I have no idea 
how to start doing this given the lack of a practical 
guide or examples in the audit standards that might help 
auditors in detecting corruption” 
 
 
 
Table 13 External auditors’ guide for detecting bribery 
 
Interviewees’ responses indicate that there is a general 
lack of understanding of the responsibility of external 
auditors for corporate corruption. The reason for this 
might pertain to the ambiguity and lack of guidance in 
the current professional audit standards with regards to  
 
external auditors’ responsibility for corporate 
corruption. This was supported by Kassem and Higson 
(2016) who found the responsibility of external auditors 
for corporate corruption was not directly and clearly 
stated in the audit standards but rather implied. The 
Types of Bribery Red flags Suggested Audit Procedures 
Kickbacks The difference in price between the materials that were 
contracted for and those that were actually delivered 
Inquire of management 
Bid-rigging A particular contractor repeatedly wins the contract Auditors should investigate what actually happens for bidders 
participating in the various bids. They should also inquire key 
employees and management about the reason behind this. 
Kickbacks and 
Bid-rigging 
An employee of the company who has close 
relationships with the supplier 
The auditor could compare the disclosed names and addresses 
of employees with the vendors list to reveal if a vendor 
company is owned or run by an employee of the company 
Bid-rigging Cases when low-bid awards are frequently followed by 
change orders or amendments that significantly 
increase payments to the vendor 
Inquire of  management 
Kickbacks Unusual or unexplained fluctuation in payables, 
expenses or disbursements 
The auditor should inspect supporting documents for such 
transactions and ensure that management confirms payables 
balances on an interim basis 
Kickbacks The purchase of inferior-quality inventory or 
merchandise with very near expiration date 
Management inquiry. The auditor should also ask for a 
technical report showing the reason for buying these goods 
Kickbacks Unusually high price contracts for goods or services 
purchased by the company 
The auditor should review the contracts and bids for any trends 
in prices. A comparison with industry norms was also 
suggested. Management should also be advised to monitor price 
trends  
Kickbacks Improper or unauthorized payment for goods or 
services  
The auditor should review the contracts to highlight any 
unauthorized or improper authorisation 
Bid-rigging The existence of very large, unexplained price 
differences among bidders 
Management inquiry could highlight the reason behind this 
unexplained price differences 
Kickbacks The prices of the company’s suppliers are higher than 
market rate 
Compare the market rate with the company’s pricing policy 
Kickbacks Poor credit ratings and the company’s inability to pay 
its debt in due dates 
Management’s inquiry and  a review of credit policy 
Bid-rigging When qualified bidders fail to submit contract 
proposals or fewer bidders than expected respond to a 
request for proposals 
Review bidding contracts and inquire management 
Kickbacks Budget overruns either because of overcharges or 
excessive quantities purchased or both 
The auditor should scrutinize large budget overruns and should 
inquire management about any large differences between actual 
and budgeted amounts. Actual expenditures should also be 
compared to prior years 
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authors stated that the audit standards did not provide 
guidance to external auditors on how to identify 
material misstatements caused by corruption nor how to 
assess and respond to corruption and bribery risks. This 
issue needs to be taken into consideration by audit 
regulators.  
 
The outcome of the current study is a guide that might 
help external auditors assess and respond to bribery 
risks. The proposed guide includes types of bribery, red 
flags for bribery ranked according to their relative 
significance, and audit procedures as a response to the 
heightened red flags for bribery as shown in table 13. 
 
CONCLUSION & RECOMMENDATIONS 
The current study aimed to provide external auditors 
with a guide that might help them assess and respond to 
bribery risks. The proposed guide includes types of 
bribery, red flags for bribery ranked according to their 
relative significance and audit procedures to respond to 
the heightened red flags for bribery. The proposed guide 
was based on findings of prior literature and the 
perception of external auditors in the Egyptian context. 
Although the current study was conducted in Egypt, the 
proposed guide included examples of red flags for 
bribery that was found in real fraud cases worldwide. 
This makes the proposed bribery guide applicable 
globally.  
 
Our results supported the current body of knowledge 
that argued for the effectiveness of red flags in assessing 
fraud risks but our study was the first to explore red 
flags for bribery.  Results also revealed that not all of 
the proposed red flags for bribery have the same 
significance.  This is important for external auditors to 
know so that they will not overlook the most significant 
red flags for bribery by assuming they all have the same 
significance in assessing bribery risks. The most 
significant red flags for bribery were “the difference in 
price between the materials that were contracted for and 
those that were actually delivered”, “a particular 
contractor repeatedly wins the contract”, and “an 
employee of the company who has close relationships 
with the supplier”.  
 
Respondents of the current study argued that corruption 
in general and bribery in particular is less likely to be 
detected by external auditors in Egypt. Some of them 
believed the reason for this pertains to the weak legal 
system, lack of guidance/tools to help external auditors 
detect corruption, and lack of understanding of the role 
of external auditors in relation to corporate corruption. 
This might also pertain to the current ambiguity in audit 
standards with regards to external auditor’s 
responsibility for corporate corruption.  
The current study thus recommends that: 
 Audit regulators clarify the responsibility of 
external auditors with regards to corporate 
corruption and bribery. Audit standards should 
also provide some guidance for external 
auditors on how to assess and respond to 
corruption and bribery risks.  
 Audit firms should provide training to external 
auditors to help them understand their 
responsibility for corporate corruption and the 
impact that corruption and bribery could have 
on the financial statements and the 
susceptibility of audit firms to reputational risk 
in case of corruption scandals.  
 Policy makers and regulators in Egypt need to 
set strict penalties for external auditors that do 
not comply with the requirements of the audit 
professional standards. There has to be a legal 
reform in Egypt that would combat corruption 
and encourage reporting about fraud cases in 
general.  
 
LIMITATIONS 
Like any other study, the current study has limitations. 
Although the current study was the first to propose a 
guide for external auditors to assess and respond to 
bribery risks, the guide was mainly based on insights 
from the audit profession in Egypt. However the 
proposed guide included examples of red flags for 
bribery that was found in real fraud cases worldwide. 
This makes the proposed bribery guide applicable 
globally. The guide needs to be empirically tested and 
replicated in different contexts to evaluate its 
effectiveness.  
 
FUTURE STUDIES 
Replicating the current study in different contexts could 
be the starting point for future research. The proposed 
guide needs to be empirically tested so that its 
effectiveness in detecting bribery could be evaluated. 
Future studies should explore other types of corruption 
and may be design other tools or guides that could help 
external auditors to properly assess and respond to 
bribery risks. More studies are still needed into the role 
of external auditors in relation to corporate corruption, 
the impact of corruption on the financial statements and 
the external audit profession.  
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